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Abstract 
The execution of EU laws by the European Commission is overseen by an 
intricate system of committees with national delegates. Comitology proce-
dures were developed to moderate Commission action in policy implemen-
tation according to member state interests. Apparently, though, comitology 
has become an instrument of greater rather than less integration in 
Europe. This paper attempts to account for why this is so, pointing in 
particular to the importance of Commission-organized expert groups for 
interest accommodation with member states. The Commission’s propensity 
to value expert knowledge for its symbolic functions is the bottom line of 
this paper’s claim that use of expert knowledge frames the discourse 
within which agreement is achieved among EU member states for imple-
menting measures. Symbolic knowledge at work bolsters the Commission’s 
credibility to drive European integration but is inconsistent with what it 
does at the administrative core of policy implementation. To make this 
argument, the paper draws on qualitative research on the administration 
of European technology policy. It accounts for organizational effects 
through analysis within an organizational learning framework that links 
the expert-based formation of knowledge with its use. 
Keywords 
Comitology, expert groups, European technology policy, symbolic knowl-
edge, political organization, organizational learning 
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Zusammenfassung 
Symbolisches Wissen in der europäischen Technologiepolitik: 
Experten, Lernen und das Ausschusswesen 
Die Implementierung europäischer Gesetze durch die EU-Kommission 
unterliegt einem komplizierten System von Verwaltungsausschüssen. Mit 
diesem Ausschusswesen („Komitologie“) wurde ursprünglich das Ziel 
verfolgt, die Exekutivfunktion der Kommission an die nationalstaatlichen 
Interessen und Präferenzen zurückzubinden. Im Laufe der Zeit scheint 
sich das Ausschusswesen jedoch zu einem Instrument vertiefter statt 
gehemmter Integration entwickelt zu haben. Das vorliegende Discussion 
Paper versucht zu verstehen warum das so ist und konzentriert sich hier-
für auf die Einbeziehung von Experten aus Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft 
durch die Kommission.  
Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen ist, dass die Kommission Expertenwis-
sen symbolisch nutzt. Symbolisches Wissen kommt bei der Überwachung 
ihrer Durchführungsbefugnisse durch die Mitgliedsländer zum Tragen. 
Damit ist gemeint, dass die Kommmission ihren institutionellen Füh-
rungsanspruch in Europa untermauert, wenn sie sich bei zustimmungs-
pflichtigen Entscheidungen über die Verteilung von Mitteln oder pro-
grammatischen Zielen auf Expertenwissen stützt. Die Legitimierung ihrer 
Exekutivfunktion gegenüber den Mitgliedsländern und die konkrete Im-
plementierung europäischer Gesetze fallen jedoch auseinander, was die 
Bedeutung des Ausschusswesens als Kontrollinstrument zumindest prekär 
erscheinen lässt. Diesem Argument liegt qualitative Forschung zur Durch-
führung europäischer Technologiepolitik zugrunde. Die Untersuchung 
stützt sich auf Theorien des Organisationslernens und verbindet so den 
Blick für die in der Kommission gängige Praxis Expertenwissen einzuho-
len mit dessen Wirkungen für die Kontrollierbarkeit ihrer Durchführungs-
befugnisse durch die Mitgliedsländer. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Commission is at the heart of the integration process in 
Europe (Nugent 2001). It plays a pivotal role in the definition of policy 
problems, the translation of initiatives into clear proposals and the man-
agement and application of Community policies; this it does with great 
openness towards the diverse and often conflicting demands from national 
governments and organized interests (Mazey and Richardson 2003; 
Schmitter 1996). The Commission’s capacity to act as a think tank and its 
power of initiative are intimately linked in its pursuit of collective solu-
tions at the European level (Laffan 1997; Metcalfe 1996). Its power among 
the institutions of the European Union depends on resources that help 
solve problems: “expert knowledge, political insight, and bargaining experi-
ence” (Kohler-Koch 1997: 48). Once legislative acts have been adopted by 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, an intricate system 
of member state committees oversees the execution of EU laws by the 
Commission. This system of about 250 monitoring committees is formal-
ized in the Council’s Comitology Decision to balance the Commission’s 
initiation power and its bias for legislative intervention (Franchino 2000). 
The procedures that were created to restrict the Commission’s executive 
powers, however, evolved over time into arrangements, which “move out-
comes toward the Commission’s preferred policies rather than those of the 
Council” (Ballmann et al. 2002: 552). This is surprising given previous 
accounts of comitology that see an overall trend toward more restrictive 
use of its procedures in the implementation of Community policies and 
therefore increasing interference from government representatives (Dogan 
1997). 
This paper tries to account for why comitology is an instrument of greater 
rather than less integration in Europe. With a view to the proliferation of 
Commission-organized expert groups over time and across sectors (Gor-
nitzka and Sverdrup 2008), section 2 develops the argument that expert 
group involvement helps the Commission to accommodate interests and 
present itself as the Community’s conscience with ideas that reflect the 
European concerns. The Commission draws on expert knowledge in a way 
that bolsters its credibility among member state governments (Boswell 
2008). Expert knowledge becomes symbolic knowledge at work when the 
Commission seeks approval for its policy choices among member state 
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governments, thereby substantiating its particular preferences and posi-
tions. Drawing on theories of organizational learning and Niels Brunsson’s 
insights about political organizations, the analytical frame in section 3 
nurtures the expectation that consultation of expert groups strengthens 
the Commission’s position with comitology committees. But this has little 
to do with what is done at the administrative core of policy implementa-
tion. Evidence for this claim is provided in section 4 with findings from 
qualitative research into the history of European technology policy imple-
mentation. Implications for control of the Commission’s implementation 
powers round out this paper. 
2. Comitology committees and expert groups in the 
implementation of European policies 
The functionalist explanation contends that the committee system oversee-
ing acts implemented by the Commission began in the 1960s with the 
development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as a response to EU 
member states’ need to delegate executive powers to the EU administra-
tion without losing control (Blom-Hansen 2008). The administrative set-up 
of comitology had staying power; it served as the precedent for many other 
areas of legislation. Rules for different degrees of delegation and control 
were formalized in the 1987 Comitology Decision in areas like environment 
policy, consumer protection, transport and energy, single market creation 
or research and technology development. Comitology enables member 
states to challenge individual administrative decisions and influence the 
broad outlines of Commission policy; it operates as an early warning sys-
tem for potential Council intervention and permits the member states to be 
closely involved in funding decisions (Dogan 1997). Oversight is limited to 
three categories of committees, viz. advisory, management and regulatory, 
whereby the level of control over the management process increases pro-
gressively from the first mentioned category to the last.  
Comitology was reformed in 1999 to streamline the accompanying proce-
dures by specifying the policy areas appropriate for each category: for 
instance, agricultural and financial support measures were to be imple-
mented under the management procedure, whereas measures of a general 
scope including the safety of humans, animals and plants were to be dealt 
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with under the regulatory procedure. The reform also increased the role of 
the European Parliament to exercise control of the Commission’s manage-
ment in areas where co-decision applies. The Commission is required to 
provide the Parliament with broad information on drafted implementation 
measures, including agendas and records of committee meetings and 
voting results of opinions delivered by a committee. Over the years, the 
major formal changes in the comitology system achieved greater systema-
tization and transparency, but at the same time they made debates more 
technical and less politically interesting (Alfé et al. 2008). The established 
comitology practice of presenting politically salient issues in technical 
terms remained (Landfried 1999). 
Controllability of the Commission’s implementation powers is frequently 
conceptualized with the principal-agent model. In this model, “the princi-
pal (member governments) entrusts the agent (Commission) with the 
necessary powers to attain pre-defined political goals (for example the 
power of direct applicability of European law)” (Egan and Wolf 1999: 251). 
The Commission serves as the engine of European integration within the 
limits of member state preferences (Pollack 1998). Delegating the task of 
proposing solutions to the Commission as the executive agent reduces 
decision-making costs among the member states (Blom-Hansen 2008), but 
the implication may be that the agent behaves in ways that diverge from 
the preferences of the principal. In principal-agent analysis, oversight 
procedures like comitology are a means to prevent “bureaucratic drift”, 
that is, the Commission’s tendency to pursue its own interests rather than 
those of its legislative principal (Ballmann et al. 2002). Principal-agent 
analysis suggests that the Commission’s primary goal is to propose inte-
grationist legislation. The price to be paid for stable discretion in this area 
is ex post control procedures (Franchino 2000). 
The tilt of principal-agent analysis towards controllability obscures the fact 
that the preferences of member state governments may be quite different, 
especially in the enlarged Union of 27 member states (Bauer 2002). There 
is no optimal way for the Commission to safeguard member state interests 
in policy implementation. Information asymmetries in favour of the Com-
mission can be exploited to accommodate interests and assume responsibil-
ity for European problems and solutions. The sharp increase of Commis-
sion-organized expert groups is noteworthy in this context: Gornitzka and 
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Sverdrup (2008) found 1237 expert groups as of January 2007 compared to 
851 such groups in 2000 and 602 in 1990. These groups do not make formal 
political decisions, but they may affect the way in which problems are 
conceived and ideas generated to resolve them, by giving advice, providing 
scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information and 
serving as forums for exchange of views and perspectives. The Commis-
sion’s interaction with expert groups is a significant element of the Euro-
pean governance structure, a routinized practice and a tool for extending 
its capacity for action, according to Gornitzka and Sverdrup. If this is true 
with regard to the Commission’s implementation powers, then control and 
oversight through comitology appears precarious. 
A critical reading of research within the epistemic communities approach 
reveals that knowledge provided by experts from academia and the busi-
ness sector to the Commission has less to do with these individuals than 
with the political structure in which they act (Radaelli 1999). The Delors 
committee, for instance, was given an authoritative voice in the movement 
that led to a substantial departure from national sovereignty over mone-
tary policy because former Commission president, Jacques Delors, used it 
to validate his idea that low inflation policy should be the basis for mone-
tary cooperation (see Verdun 1999). To conceive of epistemic community 
activity and ideas as the independent variable and decision makers’ pref-
erences as the dependent variable is misleading (see Zito 2001). The im-
plicit understanding of expert knowledge as an objective, interest-free and 
transferable good in the epistemic communities approach neglects the 
process in which it endows the Commission with authority in the policy 
process (Horn 2008).i In the political domain, expert knowledge is not “out 
there”, ready to be absorbed but is constructed to fit particular ends (Ben-
ett and Howlett 1992). The distinction between the Commission’s activities 
which aim at knowledge gathering (including policy feedback and causal 
beliefs to generate innovative ideas) and efforts to use expert knowledge as 
a political asset to oppose competing interests and broker deals is often 
blurred in practice (Brown 2000). 
Understanding the relationship between proliferating expert groups and 
comitology cannot be dealt with sufficiently in terms of the instrumental 
function that expert knowledge may have at early stages of the policy 
process. The Commission’s propensity to value expert knowledge for its 
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symbolic functions (Boswell 2008) is the bottom line of this paper’s claim 
that formation and use of expert knowledge in the implementation of 
European policies creates gaps in member state control. Symbolic knowl-
edge at work can be examined within an organizational learning frame-
work. It captures the implications of symbolic knowledge at work, which 
are the Commission’s ability to satisfy the expectations of powerful groups 
in its environment but to shield the core of supranational administration 
from criticism and external intervention. The Commission is a political 
organization that wins the support for its implementation powers and 
agenda setting because it meets the demands of member states through 
what Brunsson (1989) calls “talk” and “decision”, i.e. ideology which the 
political organization is anxious to demonstrate to the outside world but 
which may have little to do with what it actually does at the core (see 
Brunsson and Olson 1993). 
3. Learning from experts in a political organization 
Studying the formation and use of expert knowledge in the Commission 
resonates with the traditional approach in organizational learning theory 
that distinguishes between the creation of a willingness to learn, the 
accumulation, distribution and interpretation of knowledge and its inte-
gration with organizational memory as distinct stages of learning (Ber-
thoin Antal and Krebsbach-Gnath 2001; Huber 1991). This research sug-
gests that learning does not simply occur by acquiring knowledge from 
internal or external sources, but encompasses internally-based and exter-
nally-oriented strategies for identifying (new) knowledge and for dissemi-
nating that knowledge deeply and widely enough for action to be taken. 
Knowledge gains need to become meaningful to an organization’s activities 
through interpretation and memory storage in order for it to have an effect 
on organizational behaviour. Organizational learning in this perspective is 
often accompanied with the expectation that the processing of knowledge 
expands an organization’s potential range of behaviours (Child 1997). 
Stage models of learning are criticized for their overriding emphasis on the 
processing of knowledge, lacking sufficient understanding for the activities 
and social practices that sustain learning (Gherardi and Nicolini 2001). 
Applying the notion of learning to the Commission requires understanding 
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of its role as the “steering body of the world’s most encompassing suprana-
tional regime” (Hooghe 2005: 862) with an ongoing interest in the expan-
sion of its competences (Kröger 2008). In the broad range of decisions 
taken through comitology, like the allocation of grants under expenditure 
programmes or the modification of standards under health and safety 
legislation, it is unlikely “that the Commission would be able to ride rough-
shod over the interests of its opponents (which invariably include at least 
one member state), or manage its priorities in an impositional style” (Cram 
1994: 199). But the Commission can make a difference in decision making 
if it focuses on background processes like “discourse framing” or the crea-
tion of its own constituencies to raise support for particular policy solutions 
(Bauer 2002). The analytical framework below takes up these ideas and 
proceeds in three steps: (1) learning from experts starts with the evalua-
tion of the institutional environment in which decisions on the criteria 
used to identify potential recipients of Union monies are taken; (2) the 
context is scrutinized for those processes in which gathered knowledge is 
shaped to become meaningful for Commission activities and (3) used to 
bolster the Commission’s credibility. 
Towards an analytical framework 
Step 1. Comitology rules exist both in principle and in practice (Alfé et al. 
2008), a distinction that is gaining momentum in recent theorizing on 
organizations. Feldman and Pentland (2003), in particular, develop this 
distinction conceptually to examine continuity and change in rules. They 
develop the notion of performativity, which assumes that individual per-
formances of a rule may either reproduce or alter the rule through practice. 
A practice is “carried out against the backdrop of rules and expectations, 
but the particular course of action we choose is always, to some extent, 
novel” (Pentland and Feldman 2005: 796). The principle of a given rule is 
reproduced when it is used to guide the communication of normative 
expectations, to account for appropriate behaviour and to serve as point of 
departure for sense making. It is subject to change when people start to 
ignore the rule, replace it, or reproduce it differently. On these grounds it 
is argued that the recursive relationship of rules in principle and rules in 
practice helps us to assess the current functioning of comitology from a 
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dynamic perspective and account for the possibility of limited controllabil-
ity. 
Step 2. The involvement of expert groups by the Commission is conceptual-
ized as a form of “boundary spanning activities”. The notion of boundary 
spanning activities depicts the openness of organizations to their environ-
ments and captures the interactions across an organization’s external 
boundaries (Aldrich 1979). Boundary spanning activities direct attention to 
the processes by which knowledge gathered from external stakeholders is 
constructed to become relevant for organization’s ends. Knowledge formed 
through boundary spanning activities is relational, context-specific and 
anchored in the intersubjectively shared beliefs of those involved (Gherardi 
et al. 1998). Forming knowledge with external stakeholders through 
boundary spanning activities is a source of power: it absorbs uncertainty 
“by selectively paring away the world’s native complexity” (Gordenker and 
Saunders 1978: 87). 
Boundary spanning activities vary with the perceived goals, underlying 
orientations and rules that drive this process (Crozier and Friedberg 1980). 
The regulation of boundary spanning activities according to standardized 
rules and procedures leaves little manoeuvring room to the actors who are 
trying to influence the terms for defining relevant knowledge and the ways 
it is channelled into the organization. Conversely, flexibility in the regula-
tion of these activities gives the actors involved discretion to form knowl-
edge according to their interests and provide it to the organizational mem-
bers who are not directly involved in the boundary spanning activities. 
Looking at the social constitution of boundary spanning activities with its 
issues of power and regulation thus reveals that valuation of expert knowl-
edge in the Commission has to do with the structures in which it is formed 
and channelled into the administration.  
Step 3. Boundary spanning activities are linked with intraorganizational 
processes in distinctive ways (Crozier and Friedberg 1980), which deter-
mines how and to what extent the different groups in an organization gain 
access to the knowledge formed with external experts (Shrivastava 1983). 
Relevance can be created through effective handling of the communication 
flow between boundary spanning activities and those members of the 
organization who are not directly involved in these activities, but it cannot 
be established once and for all. The fact that organizations have multiple 
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realities and practices makes interpretation of constructed knowledge 
through boundary spanning activities an essential element of learning 
(Berthoin Antal et al. 2001; Levitt and March 1988). Interpretation is 
grounded in an organization’s memory or “repository of organized knowl-
edge” (Walsh 1995: 286), i.e. knowledge encoded in the norms and forms of 
an organization, its rules and routines (Huber 1991; March 1991). 
There is a tension between the stabilizing element of organizational mem-
ory (Hedberg 1981; Levitt and March 1988) and the risk of destabilizing 
the organizational core activities through the use of knowledge that is con-
structed with external stakeholders.  It may be inconsistent with concep-
tions of appropriateness in (Levinthal and March 1993) and incompatible 
with core beliefs (Wiesenthal 1995). Political organizations like the Com-
mission respond to this tension through “hypocrisy” (Brunsson 1989: 39): 
expert knowledge is drawn upon to satisfy the variety of ideas, demands 
and expectations of the diverse groups in the Commission’s environment 
and win their approval through legitimizing or substantiating particular 
decisions, but this knowledge is inconsistent with what the Commission 
does. Knowledge formed through boundary spanning activities with 
experts is mainly symbolic knowledge at work. 
4. Symbolic knowledge at work in European technology policy 
Implementation of European technology policy has been selected to study 
the implications of learning from experts for EU member state control. 
European technology policy is one of the few areas where a substantial 
policy role of the Community appears relatively uncontroversial among the 
member states (Peterson and Sharp 1998; Sandholtz 1998). But the inher-
ent fluidity and shifting priorities of the influential actors in information 
and communication (IC) technologies fuels the difficulty of getting member 
states to condone a particular approach to technology policy beyond any 
temporary compromise (Cram 1994). The Commission has learned to 
gather support for the prioritization of a particular approach to technology 
policy, to weave the knots between the powerful actors in the field and to 
act as a think tank providing new solutions to the old problem of competi-
tiveness (Cram 1994; Roobeek 1990). Increasing the importance of the 
Information Society in its agenda, was the Commission’s attempt to re-
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spond to the changes in the European industries related to IC technologies, 
where computing services became one of the few areas of growth during 
the phase of recession, market saturation and oligopolistic competition 
that plagued hardware manufacturers during the 1990s. 
Reflecting these broad changes, this paper focuses on the management and 
administration of the research and technology development programme 
that promotes a “user-friendly information society” in the 5th Framework 
Programme (1998-2002) of the European Community. It benefits from a 
qualitative study on the administration of the Information Society Tech-
nology Programme (IST). This study is based on 43 semi-structured in-
depth interviews with Commission staff (30), members of a comitology 
committee (7) and an expert group (6), conducted between 1999 and 2003 
(Böhling 2007). Interviews with Commission officials covered different 
hierarchical levels, including directors, their supporting staff, heads of unit 
and project officers. Anonymity was guaranteed. The study relied on quali-
tative methodology to furnish sufficient insight into the context of learning 
and its potential to focus on activity sequences as they unfold (Maitlis 
2005). 
The Information Society Technologies Programme was intended as a turn-
ing point to address the convergence of technologies. It integrated the 
different foci of its predecessor programmes in the 4th Framework Pro-
gramme.ii These forerunners include the European Information Technolo-
gies (ESPRIT) Programme, with its focus on information technology, 
constituting one of the building blocks of European technology policy; the 
Advanced Communication Technology and Services (ACTS) Programme 
which centred on the development of communication technologies and the 
Telematic Applications (TAP) Programme. The IST Programme was finan-
cially the largest of the four specific research programmes – it received 3.6 
billion euro in funding – within the European Community’s 5th Framework 
Programme, whose total budget amounted to 14.96 billion euro. The IST 
Programme was administered by the Directorate General for Information 
Society (DG INFSO) which too was formed in the late 1990s by merging the 
former DG for Telecommunications and Innovation with parts of the DG 
for Industry. 
The convergence of technologies may have been a sound reasoning behind 
the merger of ESPRIT, ACTS, and TAP, but once decided upon by the 
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Council and the Parliament it seemed that reality was lagging behind. 
Having begun the effort to foster convergence of technologies in the broadly 
defined Information Society and promote the utility and the affordability of 
the new goods and services to be developed within IST, it became clear 
among Directorate General staff and interested parties that the task was 
more difficult than expected. Bridges had to be built, sectors crossed and 
multi-disciplinary research fostered by an administration that did not have 
the experience to do so. Whereas the predecessor programmes had focused 
on distinguishable sectors in the economy, the Directorate General was 
now challenged to operate somewhere between the constituencies of IT, 
telecommunications, software, content producers and very different fields 
of use such as automotive manufacturing, the entertainment industry and 
the healthcare sector. The empirical evidence shows that the Directorate 
General coped with this challenge through learning from experts within 
the context of comitology. 
The current functioning of comitology in European technology 
policy 
The implementation of the IST programme in the 5th Framework Pro-
gramme was monitored by a regulatory committee. The members of the 
committee were appointed by the governments of the member states, the 
accession countries and the associated states to represent their interests in 
managing the IST. The committee had to approve the annual work pro-
grammes before they could be implemented; it also had a say in the fund-
ing decisions. One head of unit explained: “One of the decisions we [the 
Directorate General] can make is a work programme. But the member 
states must agree to that work programme before we can implement it.”iii 
The delegates had to concur with the description of the topics, the priority 
setting and budget allocation in the work programme before calls for 
proposals could be made. Hence, the subsequent evaluation of submitted 
proposals and the monitoring and evaluation of those selected were also 
contingent on the committee’s consent. In a sense, then, the Directorate 
General “can only act as good and efficient as we are supported by the 
member states”. According to another head of unit, achieving this kind of 
support implied that 
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“… the content of the work program is compatible with the national priori-
ties. … So these representatives [the committee members] know the priori-
ties of their ministries, and they want to make sure that this is reflected by 
the work programme, as it is defined in such a way that the European fund-
ing reinforces the efforts which are made by the member states.” 
The Directorate General got the support of the committee and attained the 
majority vote in decision making on the updated work programmes and 
funding of research proposals because it discussed extensively with the 
individual delegates. Interviews with the administration’s staff and com-
mittee members revealed that informal discussion and negotiations be-
tween both sides helped to reproduce the voting procedure and the other 
formal arrangements. Informal committee meetings, corridor meetings, e-
mail exchanges, phone calls and, as a national delegate explained, “infor-
mal wine tasting and dinner” with officials, took place ad hoc to reconcile 
conflicting interests and find agreement. Officials and delegates stressed 
that a “continuous dialogue” with the Directorate General acting as “con-
sensus seeker” furthered the achievement of consensus when a work 
programme was drafted. An official, in his capacity as a member of the 
support staff to one director explained: “During the course of that [interac-
tion] views change and we begin to understand what is important [and] 
what is less so through the discussion.” The importance of informal discus-
sions equally applies to the way agreement was reached about funding 
decisions, as pointed out by the following delegate: 
“Some people of the Commission say: What will you say in the committee? 
Will you say ‘No’ [to] this project? Will you say ‘Yes’? What do you want? 
What is the problem? Why is there a problem? And we have a negotiation. 
… And when we are in front of the committee, yes, we agree. But all the 
problems have been treated before, outside of the committee, in bilateral or 
trilateral meetings or between different partners. It is the classical way [to] 
work.” 
In principle the committee had a substantial say in a number of pro-
gramme management matters but in practice its influence was limited. 
The strong reliance on informal discussions for reaching agreement solidi-
fied the general expectation inside the Directorate General that the com-
mittee was “more of a financial committee that has an overseeing role in 
[the DG’s] implementation of the programme … [it gets] very little feed-
back from this committee now about directions for research.” The delegates 
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acted appropriately when representing their governments in the manage-
ment of the programme and showing an interest in its administration. 
Directorate General staff was firm on this matter, which led to disap-
pointment among delegates about the apparent lack of concern for their 
“interesting backgrounds in science, technology, and strategy … and ex-
periences like having run a national programme” in the field. One delegate 
stated: “It is true that the committee deals primarily with administrative 
tasks, but it also approves a work programme, doesn’t it? So in the [com-
mittee] there is definitely expertise available.” Regarding the preparation 
of the IST programme for its inclusion in the 6th Framework Programme, 
another delegate noted that the Directorate General “didn’t analyze the 
industrial situation. All these discussions, they were at the technology 
level. … They [DG staff] didn’t have a very clear understanding of the 
industrial situation in the different countries.” 
The committee questioned the strong technology focus in the programme’s 
implementation. It wanted to have more socioeconomic thinking incorpo-
rated in order to “really affect the needs of the industry” and “define in an 
appropriate manner their needs.” But these criticisms were buffered 
through the Directorate General’s expert-based decision-making style of 
work programme drafting. The national delegates were perceived among 
project officers as not having “strong opinions about directions for research 
and things like that”, while “most of the time they can’t agree because they 
all have different interests”. Simultaneously, delegates referred to the 
comprehensiveness of the IST programme and the size of its budget which 
made it difficult for them to discuss substantively with the administra-
tion’s staff: 
“The more widely open a programme is, the less likely it is that the dele-
gates are experts. They tend to be bureaucrats. … I would know much better 
my own country because I would know all the players. So I would under-
stand exactly the problems in a much better way. If you make a very, very 
large and very wide programme, it is very difficult for one person to discuss 
with the Commission. … The politician will not be able to discuss because he 
will lose any discussion with the Commission. The Commission will be an 
expert on what they are saying. Politicians will just say vague things.” 
Control of decision making about the selection and funding of research 
proposals was in fact biased toward the Directorate General’s preferences. 
In its “main aim to push the industrial and economic structures toward a 
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new paradigm”, the Directorate General formed alliances with powerful 
players in business and society to “help the emergence of a so-called com-
mon view”. Doing so framed the seeking of approval among the committee 
members. An official with the task to support work programme drafting 
explained that the policy-makers in the member states have to be con-
vinced “that there is an interest to develop such a vision and to address 
certain aspects in research.” The Directorate General set the agenda in the 
negotiations with the delegates through the formation of a discourse on the 
future Information Society in Europe, “running the show really with little 
influence of the member states” as one delegate observed. 
The formation of expert knowledge through boundary spanning 
activities  
The formation of the discourse on the future Information Society took 
shape in boundary spanning activities with experts who were gathered in 
an advisory group. The 26 members of the group were selected by the 
Directorate General for their expertise and authority. Most of them origi-
nated from the business sector – large, European-based corporations that 
can be considered as main drivers in the development of IC technologies. 
Drawing on the Commission decision of 22 October 1988, the Directorate 
General provided the expert group with an official mandate to advise on 
proposals for spelling out the annually updated work programme, to assess 
views about the timetable of calls for proposals, to consider criteria for 
evaluating project proposals and to determine verifiable objectives for 
achieving the aims of the IST programme’s key actions. This mandate was 
redefined in the process of drafting the work programme. Given the diffi-
culties of achieving technology convergence, the heterogeneity of the pro-
gramme’s constituency and competing interest constellations, the Direc-
torate General’s senior management eventually realized that the group’s 
speaking with a concerted voice about future trends in the Information 
Society could prove to be an asset for coming to terms with the Council 
decision on the IST programme, which required the anticipation of changes 
in technology, markets and socioeconomic contexts through annual work 
programmes. 
Kathrin Böhling y Symbolic Knowledge at Work: Comitology and Learning from Experts 14
 
 
Drafting of the work programme was guided by the norm of openness. 
“Continuously keeping the channels wide open and assessing what is going 
on” was an important task during this process, according to one head of 
unit. Receptiveness to developments in the environment was seen as 
essential for the running of the programme. Another head of unit 
explained: “You are forced, if you want to do this job properly, to follow 
very closely all technological, policy, and economic changes.” Accordingly, 
the first step in drafting the work programme was consultation with the 
affected constituency. Meetings were set up to inquire about the needs and 
preferences of the research communities, with the objective “to draw con-
clusions as well about possible actions to anticipate future needs”. To feed 
into work programme design, consultation reports were then produced, 
based on the meetings with the research communities. Some officials with 
particular responsibilities in the drafting process were concerned about the 
“danger” of consultation reports: “You might end up with a report that 
[has] a little bit of everything and … no definite line of producing.” One of 
them explained: 
“You need to focus because you do not have available all the money in the 
world to spend. … And this focusing runs counter to the fact that there are 
many interests from the various constituencies … but only a few aspects are 
considered to be of strategic importance for Europe.” 
The drafting process of the annual work programmes was the main area in 
which the involvement of the advisory group became effective. The group 
described its view on the future developments in Information Society in 
terms of the ambient intelligence vision, which was perceived as the con-
cept of converging technologies – that is, bringing together electronics, 
information technology and communications in such a way that technology 
becomes less visible, yet more relevant. 
“The key issue was to sell the idea [of ambient intelligence] to the directors 
that there was something in it for them”, as one member of the Directorate 
General unit “Work Programme and Cross-Programme Themes” noted. 
The work programme unit was a new unit designed to coordinate the 
drafting of work programmes; it operated horizontally across the different 
directorates of the administrative hierarchy. Because the work programme 
unit had a stake in the establishment of a coalition between the Director-
ate General’s senior management and the expert group, the unit used the 
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plenary meetings of the group to nurture agreement on a rationale that 
could bind the different parts of the programme together. Its immediate 
access to the directors and the group’s experts gave it authority in the 
delicate balancing of work programme drafting. The work programme unit 
looked at the group’s advisory reports as “key recommendations” because 
they “reinforced [its] position … as a unit [strengthening its ability and 
power] to give orientation.” 
Because of initial scepticism among some members of the experts group 
concerning their exact role in programme design, a set of rules was created 
to encourage them to share their views on the programme’s content and 
direction with the directors in the Directorate General. Flexibility in regu-
lating the group’s conduct provided the opportunity for the work pro-
gramme unit to strengthen its role in the drafting process. One of the 
unit’s members explained: “There were no precedents for how to manage or 
run [the expert group in the Directorate General]. … There was no ideal 
size and no ideal constitution.” The broad guidelines for the group’s work 
were determined in the plenary sessions, held on four or five days a year in 
Brussels. One group member described the interaction thus: “And then 
these kinds of things are linked with internal things in the Commission: 
we have to take such and such decisions … for us to influence it; we need 
that thing [by] then. That is how it works and it works quite well.” 
The work programme unit made sure that the recommendations of the 
group were channelled into the Directorate General; the unit also exerted 
influence concerning how these were dealt with internally. Thus use of the 
recommendations became a source of power for the work programme unit 
in its capacity as coordinator of the editorial board (created to generate a 
first draft of the work programme). The unit, consisting of representatives 
from various directorates, pulled together the consultation reports and 
additional inputs from each of these directorates; it then proposed a first 
draft to the editorial board and the directors. Although it lacked the formal 
authority to decide on the content, its influence was undisputable: As one 
official external to the work programme unit candidly observed, “every-
thing else is [just] an adjustment of the very first strategy that is taken.” 
The work programme unit was “holding the pen” in the editing process: 
“So they [pull] this together with my director and some support from the 
operational sector. … But essentially someone has to hold the pen, so it 
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comes down to these few people … the process of writing or distilling 
information, in passing it on that certain facts and figures have to be put in, 
certain facts and figures have to be left out. It’s in the [author’s mind], for 
[what] purpose he is writing – what should go forward. Some information 
[is] passed, some … left behind.” 
This led many of the Directorate General’s staff to believe that major 
decisions on the content of the programme were taken within this unit, the 
advisory group “and whoever they talk[ed] to.” By the end of 2000, then, 
just one year after the vision of ambient intelligence was introduced, it 
“had become a mainstream philosophy and [in] that sense you [get] things 
[done more easily] if you link [up] to that concept.” Reference to the ambi-
ent intelligence vision meant desirable action in the Directorate General: 
“When you try to write something and you want to get it through, you tend 
[at the same time to refer] to the ambient intelligence vision.” In early 
2003, when the Directorate General started to implement the follow-up 
IST Programme within the 6th Framework Programme, pragmatic use of 
the consensus on the ambient intelligence vision was common practice 
among officials. It “has made quite an impact on the thinking. ... It is a 
guiding vision for the whole programme and everybody is recognizing it.” 
Inconsistence between external representation and core beliefs 
A crucial issue in theories of organizational learning is the process in 
which adopted knowledge is embedded in an organization’s established 
beliefs and practices. Looking at the ways in which the notion of ambient 
intelligence was handled inside the Directorate General indicates that the 
initial definition of the term by those who were directly involved in bound-
ary spanning activities with external experts became relative. The Direc-
torate General is far from being monolithic. The vision of ambient intelli-
gence has connotations other than its being a mere guideline for the pro-
gramme as a whole. Among project officers, one of the major issues in the 
discussion of this vision concerned its origin because, in the words of one 
interviewee, 
“… this clearly came from Philips. So there is some company culture also 
behind it; there are some corporate interests … behind it … you have to 
always [be aware of] … how far this should influence [you]; you should know 
what interests are behind [it] and what industries.” 
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The ambient intelligence vision was criticized for its bias towards home 
electronics and entertainment; it seemed to be of little use for application 
in professional working environments – a “fuzzy term” with limited rele-
vance for the great bandwidth of research activities within the programme. 
In the words of one critical interviewee, 
“I strongly believe that there is no IST vision. ... This vision doesn’t apply to 
the full Information Society applications. It … originated from [the] con-
sumer electronics manufacturers’ view and the specific situation of the home 
user. So when you try to expand it and to speak of ambient intelligence as 
an overall structuring vision, either it totally breaks down, that is it 
becomes such a fuzzy term that everybody can just say, ‘Oh, I am doing 
something that contributes to ambient intelligence!’ or it generates rela-
tively absurd results. ... I think I can even prove that it doesn’t exist because 
I can prove that many of the individual visions that are implemented are 
contradictory with each other and have not been reconciled or arbitrated in 
the sense that if a vision [is] structuring, then we [choose] one thing and not 
another.” 
The discussion about the ambient intelligence vision was fuelled by at least 
two factors: the Directorate General’s relatively high-calibre staff and its 
particular organizational culture. More than half of the 540 people working 
for the administration were scientifically trained, performing administra-
tive and advisory duties. Possessing a considerable level of expertise im-
plied that a large share of the administration’s personnel was knowledge-
able about the technologies, their main drivers and significant actors of 
(parts of) the IST programme. The vision was therefore perceived as just 
one way to present trends in the evolution of technologies. The ability to 
assess trends and developments relevant for the programme management 
was also coloured by different programme cultures stemming from IST 
predecessor programmes. In 2003, four years after the Directorate General 
was formed, officials pointed out the continued existence of different work-
ing practices at the operational level of programme implementation: 
“How reviews are done, how projects are monitored; there are different cul-
tures going. It depends [on whether] you come from ESPRIT, from ACTS, 
from Telematics. ... I mean they [some methods] got a bit more streamlined, 
but you still see a lot of different ways of how projects are monitored, de-
pending on where the people came from.” 
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The adoption of ambient intelligence as the official programme vision has 
effected only limited change in the Commission’s underlying beliefs about 
goals and objectives of IST within the 5th Framework Programme. The 
official rationale behind the IST was inconsistent with the Directorate 
General’s core beliefs. Reference to the vision was primarily a means of 
external representation, which resulted from  
“daily [involvement] in discussing the Commission’s vision with [its] cus-
tomers, with the [members of the] research community in Europe who want 
to know where [the Commission’s] focus is, … where they would be more 
likely to be successful in bidding for funding for research, …  what topics to 
choose.” 
Using the notion of ambient intelligence in this way helped the Directorate 
General to legitimate its role for the EU member states as the driving force 
behind the development of IC technologies in Europe and this saved it from 
having its conduct questioned. 
5. Conclusions 
Europe’s comitology system with its oversight procedures and committees 
was created to control the Commission’s delegated powers in the imple-
mentation of Community policies. In practice, comitology nurtures the 
consensus-forcing decision making style among the EU member states so 
that individual delegates may be seen as assisting rather than checking 
the Commission’s executive function (Alfé et al. 2008). The fact that comi-
tology barely results in overt conflict between member state delegates and 
Commission officials on a proposal (Ballman et al. 2002) fits well into the 
underlying picture of the Commission as an agent that serves the interests 
of its governmental principals. But routinized regard for their interests 
during the different stages of the policy process does not necessarily serve 
member states’ inclination to control the Commission. It may have the 
opposite effect even in the enlarged Union of 27 member states if the 
Commission chooses to cut through potential conflicts by commissioning 
the provision of effective solutions to experts. There is dynamism in comi-
tology, which provides evidence for historical institutionalism’s account, 
according to which the current functioning of institutions may be quite 
different from the intentions that led to their establishment: 
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“As European-level decision making becomes both more prevalent and more 
complex, it places growing demands on the gatekeepers of member-state 
sovereignty. In this context, time constraints, scarcities of information, and 
the need to delegate decisions to experts may promote unanticipated conse-
quences and lead to considerable gaps in member state control.” (Pierson 
1996: 137) 
The recent proliferation of expert groups that are organized by the Com-
mission requires a comprehensive understanding of their contribution to 
the consensus-forcing decision making style in Europe. This analysis of the 
implementation of European technology policy indicates that consultation 
with an expert group helped the Directorate General for Information Soci-
ety to attain an agreement among the EU member states for those propos-
als requiring their consent; this also allowed the DG to present itself as the 
engine of European integration. Gaps in member state control occurred 
because the Directorate General shaped the discourse within which policy 
decisions were taken with little de facto influence from member state 
representatives. It determined the performance criteria according to which 
it wanted to be assessed. The knowledge the Directorate General made 
sure to gain access to in the boundary spanning activities with the expert 
group became a means of winning the support for its implementation 
powers. It was symbolic knowledge at work that decoupled talk and deci-
sion from action. Gaps in member state control of supranational admini-
stration are therefore not only the outcome of turning political questions 
into technical issues but also the result of organized hypocrisy: talk and 
decision on the development of IC technologies that could bring competi-
tive advantage to Europe in the future were buffered from action in this 
area. 
From this single case study it is difficult to say that inconsistence between 
ideology and action is an overall characterizing feature of the Commis-
sion’s administrative fabric. The Commission is distinctive in terms of its 
sectoralization and fragmentation with very different working practices 
across its Directorate Generals and quite different relationships with the 
important actors of the separate policy sectors they address (Cini 1997; 
Nugent 2001). But it may prove worthwhile to treat the Commission’s 
Directorate Generals as political organizations for creating critical aware-
ness of the ongoing practice whereby relationships with expert groups are 
nurtured to supplement the Commission’s own resources. The Commission 
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wins legitimacy for its implementing powers by associating itself with the 
manifold and often conflicting demands and expectations of governments. 
It is likely that comitology will become an institutional forum that facili-
tates intergovernmental discourse and promotes transnational social 
integration if it meets the challenge “[of enhancing] the discursive capabili-
ties of governmental delegates, provid[ing] more accountability by increas-
ing transparency and clarify[ing] the role of the EP in the political admini-
stration of the EU” (Neyer 2000: 114). To account for the public interest in 
the centralized implementation of European policies, however, politiciza-
tion of expertise seems crucial. 
Notes
 
i See also Barnett and Finnemore (1999) and St. Clair (2006) who make this 
point with regard to international organizations. 
ii The mobile phone, for instance, demonstrates the convergence of single 
technologies into network technologies. With the possibility of sending and 
receiving emails, surfing the internet, and downloading music and videos, 
categorization becomes a tricky issue. Is this mobile device a phone, PC, TV, 
DVD recorder, or play station? The proclaimed convergence of technologies is 
accompanied by a blurring of the boundaries between what used to be histori-
cally distinct sectors in economy. 
iii All quotations in section 4 have been excerpted from the transcripts of a 
series of 43 semi-structured, in-depth, anonymous interviews with 30 Euro-
pean Commission staff, seven members of a comitology committee and six 
members of an expert group, conducted in Brussels, Luxemburg and as tele-
phone interviews between 1999 and 2003. 
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